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CASENOTE

MEDELLiN V. TEXAS: THE TREATIES THAT BIND

I. INTRODUCTION
Determining the domestic effect of international treaties has
long provided fodder for scholarly debate. Recently, that debate
grew into a legal and international relations nightmare for the
United States. The Supremacy Clause states, "[A]ll Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby."z Unfortunately for lawyers
and foreign nations alike, simplicity in text does not lead to comprehensibility in practice. 2 The United States' system of checks
and balances and the separation of powers doctrine greatly complicate who may give domestic effect to treaties and exactly what
that effect will be.3 Recently, in Case ConcerningAvena and Other Mexican Nationals, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")
asked the United States to review and reconsider the state court
cases of several Mexican nationals whose Vienna Convention
rights had been violated. 4 In a memorandum, President Bush directed state courts to "give effect to the decision." 5 These events

1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2. See Penny J. White, Legal, Political,and Ethical Hurdles to Applying International Human Rights Law in the State Courts of the United States (and Arguments for Scaling
Them), 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 937, 937 (2003).
3. See id. at 938-40.
4. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
12, 14, 72 (Mar. 31).
5. Memorandum for the Attorney General on Compliance with the Decision of the
International Court of Justice in Avena (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html [hereinafter President's Memorandum]; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. 187a, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct.
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created a "perfect storm" that tested the limits of federalism, executive power, preemption, and international treaty obligations.6
In Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court of the United States
attempted to untangle this web of legal doctrines, finding that
neither an ICJ judgment nor a presidential directive could overrule state procedure.7 Part II of this note addresses the many
complex issues involved in Medellin, including the breadth of executive power, the nature of the Vienna Convention, and courts'
interpretations of the United States' obligations under that
agreement. Part III reviews the posture of the Medellin decision.
Part IV analyzes the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in this case. Part V discusses Medellin's case after the Supreme Court decision and his ultimate execution by the State of
Texas. Finally, Part VI addresses the potential effects of Medellin
and the questions the decision left unanswered.
II. HISTORY
A. The Executives' Treaty Enforcement Power
Any analysis of executive power must begin with Justice Jackson's "tripartite scheme" from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.8 According to Justice Jackson, executive power falls into
three categories, from the most certain grants of presidential
power to the least-when the President acts under express Congressional authorization, 9 when the President acts using his own
independent powers,lO and when he acts in direct conflict with
1346 (2008) (No. 06-984).
6. Indeed, "Medellin v. Texas could be a law-school exam unto itself. It touches on the
separation of powers and the supremacy clause, international treaties and state criminal
codes, federalism and the reach of the president's diplomatic authority, all wrapped up in
fundamental questions about the scope of judicial review." Dahlia Lithwick, Texas Holds
Him: Leave It to Texas to Put a Stop to Executive Overreaching,SLATE, Oct. 10, 2007, http:
H/www.slate.com/id/2175648.
7. Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1353 (2008).
8. See id. at 1368 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635-39 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
9. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.").
10. Id. at 637 ("When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
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the will of Congress.11 Regarding the President's power in foreign
affairs, the President certainly may "make treaties."12 In addition, Article II of the Constitution also gives the President the
power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."13
However, whether these Article II powers imply a power to domestically enforce such treaties is much less certain.14
B. Supremacy Clause and Development of the Self-Executing!
Non-Self-Executing Treaty
The framers wrestled with what effect treaties should have
upon domestic law and who should have the power to enter into
and execute international agreements.15 Federalists urged that
the Supremacy Clause was necessary for the United States to act
as one with respect to other nations.16 Internal strife, they argued, would deter nations from entering into treaties with the
United States.17 Anti-Federalists criticized the Supremacy
Clause as an unchecked authorization of power.iS These critics
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent
presidential responsibility.").
11. Id. at 637-38 ("When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb ....Courts can sustain
exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting
upon the subject.").
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
13. Id. art. II, § 3.
14. Compare Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs
Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 340 (2006) ("From its text, context, and foundational
principles, the Constitution refutes any claim of an inherent, discretionary executive power to enforce international law."), with Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 331, 402 (2008) ("[Tlhe Constitution's Take Care Clause confers limited
authority on the President as a function of his duty to enforce treaty obligations.").
15. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution,
and the Original Understanding,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2040 (1999).
16. See Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation,50 VILL.
L. REV. 25, 39 (2005) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 260 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)); see also Ryan D. Newman, Note, Treaty Rights and Remedies: The
Virtues of a Clear Statement Rule, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 419, 433-34 (2007) ("After all, if
treaties do not act directly on individuals, do not have compulsive force beyond diplomacy
or war, and are not enforceable in domestic courts, then how can governments ensure
treaty compliance within their borders?").
17. Glashausser, supra note 16, at 39 (citing THE FEDERALIST 22, at 144 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
18. Yoo, supra note 15, at 2042 (citing Letter IV from Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1787),
reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
43-44 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983)).
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also warned of the danger of combining the power to legislate and
the power to make treaties.19 As a check on this feared, unbounded power, George Mason proposed that for any treaty to
have domestic effect, legislation was required. 2 0 Though scholars
disagree on the significance of such a proposal, such debates laid
the foundation for the controversy over the domestic effect of international agreements. 2 1
The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties appeared early in our nation's history. In Foster v. Neilson, Chief Justice Marshall famously stated that a treaty is
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of
the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages
to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the
22
contract before it can become a rule for the Court.

The first treaty Justice Marshall describes is a self-executing
treaty. 23 The latter description refers to a non-self-executing treaty. 24 In order to determine how to classify a particular treaty,
courts look to both the treaty itself and the circumstances of its
ratification. 25 Though this appears to be a straightforward model
for the domestic enforcement of treaties, recent jurisprudence regarding the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("Vienna
Convention") proves domestic treaty enforcement is anything but
simple.

19. Id. at 2043.
20. Id.
21. Compare id. at 2074 ("While the Supremacy Clause declared the superiority of
treaties to state law, the Framers did not understand it to override the separation of powers principle that treaties that sought to have a domestic, legislative effect could not take
effect without congressional implementation."), with Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?:
Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the
Land," 99 COLUM. L. Rev. 2095, 2152 (1999) ("The ratification debates reveal Antifederalist nervousness ...yet this opposition was neither strong, united, nor sophisticated.").
22. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). The case involved a title dispute over land originally ceded to the United States in a treaty between France and Spain. Id. at 254-55.
23. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008) (citing Foster, 27 U.S. at 314).
24. Id. ("When, in contrast, '[treaty] stipulations are not self-executing they can only
be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect."') (alteration in original)
(quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111(3)-(4) (1987); see also
Tim Wu, Treaties' Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 579 (2007) ("[Clourts have created multiple-part tests designed to tell the difference between a treaty intended to be selfexecuting and its non-self-executing brethren.").
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C. The Vienna Convention and Discerning the Limits of a Treaty's
Domestic Effect
The United States ratified the Vienna Convention and the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention ("Optional Protocol") in 1969.26
Delineating duties, privileges, and immunities of consulates in
foreign nations, the Vienna Convention serves to facilitate relationships among nations, "irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems." 27 Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention states that the treaty parties must timely inform a
person's consulate should that person be detained in a foreign
country and must "inform the [detainee] without delay of his
rights" to request assistance from the consul of his own state. 28 In
addition, parties to the Optional Protocol agreed that disputes
arising from the Vienna Convention "shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice." 2 9 The
United States, by signing the Optional Protocol, assented to the
specific jurisdiction of the ICJ for claims arising under the Vienna
Convention.30
The ICJ and Article 36's effect on domestic criminal procedure
gave rise to Breard v. Greene.3 1 There, the Court held Breard had
procedurally defaulted on his Vienna Convention claim because
32
he did not raise the claim during his initial criminal proceeding.
While the Court noted it "should give respectful consideration" to

26. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1353.
27. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963 21 U.S.T. 77, 79, 596
U.N.T.S. 261, 262 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
28. Vienna Convention, supra note 27, art. 36(1)(b).
29. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, art. I., Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, 596 U.N.T.S.
487, 488.
30. Medelin, 128 S. Ct. at 1354. However, in 2005, the United States withdrew from
the Optional Protocol, after the ICJ's decision in Avena. Id.
31. 523 U.S. 371 (1998). Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, was convicted in Virginia of
attempted rape and murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 372-73. In his petition for habeas relief, Breard claimed his Vienna Convention rights had been violated as he had not
been notified of his right to inform his consulate. Id. at 373. Paraguay brought the case
before the ICJ, where the ICJ "request[ed] that the United States 'take all measures at is
disposal to ensure that ... Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings."' Id. at 374.
32. Id. at 375. As the Court noted, "[iut is the rule in this country that assertions of
error in criminal proceedings must first be raised in state court in order to form the basis
for relief in habeas." Id. (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)).
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the ICJ's ruling, the United States' rules of procedure dictate the
implementation of the Vienna Convention unless there is "a clear
and express statement to the contrary." 3 3 Further, the Court implied that to allow Breard to raise his Vienna Convention claim at
this stage in his proceedings would give him more rights than a
United States citizen. 3 4 Even if Breard could raise such a claim,
the Court found it unlikely he would be able to prove he was prejudiced because of a violation of his Vienna Convention rights.35
Thus, while the Court looked unfavorably upon Virginia's decision to proceed swiftly with Breard's execution, the courts noted
"nothing in ...existing case law allows us to make that [decision
for Virginia] ."36
In the years following Breard, the ICJ issued two opinions regarding procedural default and the raising of Vienna Convention
claims. As explained in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the ICJ held
in the LaGrand Case that the procedural default rule "'prevented
[courts] from attaching any legal significance' to the fact that the
violation of Article 36 kept the foreign governments from assisting in their nationals' defense."37 Based on this opinion, the ICJ
issued its decision in Avena, requesting that the United States
review and reconsider the cases of several Mexican citizens who
were neither informed nor timely notified of their Vienna Convention rights.38
In Sanchez-Llamas, the Court ruled that these ICJ decisions
,did not "compel [it] to reconsider [its] understanding of the Convention in Breard."39 Relying heavily on Breard, the Court stated
that ICJ judgments cannot dictate domestic court opinions and
noted the importance of procedural default rules in the United
States' judicial system. 4 0 The Court again emphasized that such
rules apply to all American citizens, and "[i]t is no slight to the

33.

Id.

34. See id. at 376 ("[A]lithough treaties are recognized by our Constitution as the supreme law of the land, that status is no less true of provisions of the Constitution itself, to
which rules of procedural default apply.").
35. Id. at 377.
36. Id. at 378.
37. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497 (June 27)).
38. Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 72
(Mar. 31).
39. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 353.
40. Id. at 354-57.
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Convention to deny petitioners' claims under the same principles
we would apply to an Act of Congress, or to the Constitution itself."41
III. BACKGROUND OF THE MEDELLIN CASE
In the most recent Vienna Convention case before the Supreme
Court, Jos6 Ernesto Medellin, a Mexican national, claimed the
United States violated his rights under the Vienna Convention in
the course of his capital murder conviction. 4 2 During his arrest,
police officers did not inform Medellin of his right to notify his
consulate of his incarceration. 43 In his original trial, Medellin
failed to raise this claim; instead, he initially raised it in his first
application for relief-after his sentencing. 4 4 He exhausted his
state and federal appeals, with all courts reaching the same conclusion: by failing to raise his Vienna Convention claim at trial,
Medellin procedurally defaulted and therefore could not raise this
claim in post-conviction or appellate proceedings. 4 5
During the Medellin trial, the ICJ handed down its opinion in
Avena, requesting that the United States review and reconsider
the cases of fifty Mexican nationals who had not been properly informed of their Vienna Convention rights. 4 6 Following the ICJ
decision, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum
("President's Memorandum"), stating that "the United States will
discharge its international obligations under the decision of the
International Court of Justice in [Avena], by having State courts
give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of
comity."4 7 Medellin then filed a second habeas corpus petition in
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which held that the Avena

41. Id. at 360.
42. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1354 (2008).
43. Exparte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
44. See id.
45. See Medellin v. Cockrell, No. H-01-4078, 2003 WL 25321243, at *11 (S.D. Tex.,
June 25, 2003); id. at *1 (summarizing prior decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals).
46. Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1355 (citing Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 53-57, 72).
47. President's Memorandum, supra note 5. Interestingly, in Sanchez-Llamas v.Oregon, the Court noted the President's Memorandum did not take "the view that the ICJ's
interpretation of Article 36 is binding on [United States's] courts." 548 U.S. 331, 355
(2006).
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decision by the ICJ and the President's Memorandum did not
create "binding federal law." 4 8
In a six-three decision, the Supreme Court of the United Sates
affirmed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment.49 Examining the relevant treaties and prior case law, the Court found
nothing to suggest the Avena judgment was binding upon state
courts.50 The majority also held that the Executive could not unilaterally make such a judgment binding.51 The dissent, however,
viewed Avena as binding upon state courts because of the nature
of the treaties from which such a judgment originated, as well as
the possible international repercussions of failure to comply with
an ICJ judgment.52 In light of this view, dissenting Justice Breyer determined that analyzing the effect of the President's Memorandum was unnecessary. 5 3
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
1. Avena Does Not Automatically Preempt State Law
Chief Justice Roberts drew a distinction between international
legal obligations and binding federal law. 54 Noting the classification scheme for self-executing and non-self-executing treaties established by precedent, the majority noted that "while treaties
'may comprise international commitments ...they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'selfexecuting' and is ratified on these terms."' 55 For the Court, the is-

48. Exparte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 352.
49. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372.
50. Id. at 1353.
51. Id. at 1371.
52. Id. at 1377, 1390-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1390-91.
54. Id. at 1356 (majority opinion).
55. Id. (quoting Igartda-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir.
2005) (en banc)). As Justice Roberts noted, many definitions for "self-executing" and "nonself-executing" exist. For the purposes of this opinion, a "self-executing' [treaty] ... has
automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification .... Conversely, "a 'non-selfexecuting' treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law. ...
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sue was not whether the Vienna Convention and its Optional Protocol create binding federal law (i.e. whether the treaty is selfexecuting), but rather whether the Avena judgment itself,
through the United States's treaty obligations, has a binding effect upon the United States.56 Without the requisite legislation to
bind the United States to comply with the Optional Protocol,
United Nations Charter, and ICJ Statute, the Court held, the
judgment cannot automatically bind domestic courts. 5 7
The Court consulted both the text and relevant drafting history
to interpret the pertinent treaties.58 When the United States
signed the Optional Protocol and consented to ICJ jurisdiction for
Vienna Convention disputes, it did not "agree to be bound" by
such judgments. 59 Indeed, the Court noted that the Protocol does
not specify the domestic repercussions of an ICJ decision, nor
does it provide an enforcement mechanism for such judgments. 60
Instead, this obligation lies in Article 94 of the United Nations
Charter ("U.N. Charter").61
Article 94(1) states that "[e]ach member of the United Nations
undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to
which it is a party."6 2 Focusing on the language "undertakes to
comply," the Court classified the U.N. Charter as a non-selfexecuting provision because "undertakes" connotes anticipated
future action by the parties. 63 Indeed, if ICJ decisions automatically bound domestic courts, Article 94(2), which specifies remedies for noncompliance, 64 would be rendered superfluous. 6 5 The
legislative history indicated the United States signed the U.N.
Charter with this understanding in mind and therefore would
never have expected ICJ judgments to be automatically enforcea[and] depends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress" to have domestic effect.
Id. at 1356-57 n.2.
56. Id. at 1357 n.4.
57. Id. at 1357.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1358.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. U.N. Charter, art. 94, § 1.
63. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1358-59.
64. U.N Charter, art. 94, § 2. ("If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations
incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations
or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.").
65. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1359-60.
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ble and thus binding on state and federal courts through the Supremacy Clause. 66 Article 94(2) "fatally undermine[d]" Medellin's
case. 67
The ICJ Statute sounded the final death knell for Medellin's
automatic enforceability argument. 68 Article 59 of the statute stipulates that 'the decision of the [ICJ] has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case." 69 The
United States and Mexico, not Medellin, were parties to the Avena case. 70 Therefore, the Court reasoned, Avena cannot dictate
the outcome of Medellin's individual case. 71 Because none of these
treaties require enforcing ICJ judgments in domestic courts, the
United States is not bound by Avena. 72
In reviewing the post-ratification understanding of the Vienpa
Convention, the Court focused on what the Convention parties
did not understand at the time of signing. 73 The majority concluded that no signatory nation to the Vienna Convention viewed
ICJ judgments as domestically binding, and nothing suggested
that these nations would reciprocate should the United States in
fact treat such judgments as binding.74 In addition, precedent
dictated that 'absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State."'75 No statement in the relevant agreements suggested, let alone expressed, that the
parties intended for ICJ judgments to override state procedure. 76
The Court noted that if ICJ judgments were automatically binding upon the United States, as Medellin contended, such decisions would not be appealable. 77 The possible ramifications for
66. Id. at 1359.
67. Id. at 1360.
68. Id.

69. U.N. Charter art. 59.
70. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1360.
71. Id. at 1360-61. Reviewing Avena, the Court noted the ICJ's instruction to the
United States to review the affected cases however it deems appropriate. Id. at 1361 n.9
(quoting Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 72
(Mar. 31)). Indeed, "[t]his language ... confirm[s] that domestic enforceability in court is
not part and parcel of an ICJ judgment." Id.
72. Id. at 1361 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon 548 U.S. 331, 347 (2006)).
73. Id. at 1363-64.
74. Id. at 1363.
75. Id. (quoting Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 351 (citation omitted)).

76.

Id. at 1364.

77.

Id.
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the ruling Medellin sought, the Court stated, "give pause."78 Such
a holding would lead to "the improbable result of giving the
judgments of an international tribunal a higher status than that
enjoyed by 'many of our most fundamental constitutional protections."'79

2. The President Cannot Unilaterally Cause Avena To Bind
State Courts
The Court agreed with the United States that the President is
best suited to further foreign policy interests.8 0 However, this
consideration alone does not guarantee an absolute and unchecked right to create binding law from non-self-executing treaties.8 1 The President must act within the limits placed on his constitutional power, as specified in Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion in Youngstown.8 2 Using the Youngstown analysis, the
Court dismissed the notion that President Bush's actions were an
implied or expressed authorization of Congress.8 3 Indeed, "[t]he
responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising
from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress." 8 4 To convert a non-self-executing treaty into binding domestic law requires nothing less than passing law, a power that
solely lies within Congress's authority.8 5 Because President Bush
did not have congressional authorization for his actions, the
Court had to find another justification to hold that the President's
Memorandum transformed Avena into a domestically binding
judgment.8 6
The second category of Justice Jackson's Youngstown presidential power scheme-pervasive congressional acquiescence may
imply presidential power 87-similarly failed to support President

78. Id.
79. Id. at 1367 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 360).
80. Id. (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1112, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346) (2008) (No. 06-984)).
81. See id. at 1368.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1368-69.
86. Id. at 1371.
87. Id. at 1368.
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Bush's actions.S8 Simply put, Congress cannot previously have
acquiesced to something the United States itself has demonstrated is "unprecedented." 89 As such, President Bush's power "cannot
stretch so far as to support the current Presidential Memorandum."90
The Court also rejected the Petitioner's third argument, that
President Bush's actions were within his "Take Care" power. 9 1
Although not expressly stated, the Court seemed to place this in
Jackson's third category of analysis, "[w]hen the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb."92 Because the President
cannot unilaterally make Avena domestic law, the President cannot use the "Take Care" power to "execute" a judgment, in effect,
to make Avena law. 9 3 To hold otherwise, the Court implied, would
be incompatible with Congress's sole power to create laws. 9 4
B. ConcurringOpinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's reading of "undertakes to comply" in Article 94(1) of the
U.N. Charter-the inclusion of such words points to an understanding of "future action by the political branches."95 However,
Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority as to the effect of
these words. While the majority interpreted "undertakes to comply" to refer simply to legislation necessary to effectuate a non-selfexecuting treaty as binding domestic law, 96 Justice Stevens interpreted the words more broadly.97 In his view, "undertak[ing] to
comply" goes beyond legislation; it speaks to the U.N. Charter
signatories' promise to act in good faith with the U.N. Charter

88. Id. at 1368, 1371-72.
89. Id. at 1372. To support its argument, the government could not point to any prior
Congressional acquiescence to a "Presidential directive issued to state courts, much less
one that reaches deep into the heart of the State's police powers ... " Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see Brief for Petitioner at 28-29, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No.
06-984).
92. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
93. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372.

94.

See id.

95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1373 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See id. at 1358-59 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1373 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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and ICJ judgments. 98 Because the cost of complying with the
Avena judgment would be low compared to the high cost of damaging the United States' international reputation, "Texas would
do well to recognize that more is at stake than whether judgments of the ICJ, and the principled admonitions of the President
of the United States, trump state procedural rules in the absence
of implementing legislation."9 9 While the Avena judgment may
not compel Texas to review and reconsider Medellin's case, Justice Stevens believed Texas should nevertheless do so. 10 0
C. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Justice Breyer focused on whether the treaties
laying the foundation for the Avena decision are self-executing,
rather than on whether Avena itself is self-executing.101 Because
of the Supremacy Clause and the self-executing nature of the
agreements relevant to this case, the dissent concluded that Avena requires no further legislation to become binding domestic
law.10 2 To support his argument, Justice Breyer relied on
precedent to demonstrate that the Supreme Court has held several treaties to be self-executing.1 03 Justice Breyer argued that no
precedent, however, clearly answered whether a particular treaty
provision is self-executing with the level of "textual clarity" the
majority required.104 Indeed, if treaties explicitly stated which
provisions were self-executing, Justice Breyer posited, many nations would not enter into such treaties.05 The fact that a treaty
does not instruct as to whether a provision will be self-executing
was of no consequence to the dissent.106
Instead, the dissent relied on both the treaty's subject matter
and seven "context-specific criteria" to determine that the United

98. See id. at 1373-74.
99. Id. at 1375.
100. See id. This mirrors Justice Stevens's call for caution in Breard v. Greene, where
he dissented "from the decision to act hastily rather than with the deliberation that is appropriate in a case of this character." 523 U.S. 371, 380 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1376 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 1377.
103. Id. at 1377-79.
104. See id. at 1381.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1381-82.
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States is bound by the ICJ judgment in the Avena case. 1 0 7 The
factors used by Justice Breyer to reach this conclusion include the
language of the treaty and the practical implications if the treaty
is not domestically enforceable.108 Regarding the language of the
U.N. Charter, the dissent interpreted "undertake to comply" more
narrowly than the majority-the language creates "a present obligation to execute, without any tentativeness of the sort [found
by the majority]."109 Justice Breyer also cautioned that not enforcing the Avena judgment would "undermine longstanding efforts ... to create an effective international system."110
Though the dissent did not elaborate on the constitutionality of
the President's Memorandum, it did not agree with the majority's
opinion on the matter.1 1 1 Justice Breyer placed the President's
foreign affairs authority in the second category of Youngstown's
taxonomy-Congress has neither sanctioned nor prohibited the
exercise of such power. 1 12 In conclusion, the dissent stated that
the majority's opinion causes the United States to "break its word
even though the President seeks to live up to that word and Congress has done nothing to suggest the contrary."11 3
V. THE FATE OF MEDELLIN
Medellin's story does not end with this landmark Supreme
Court opinion. After the Supreme Court affirmed the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals' dismissal of his writ of habeas corpus, 11 4
Medellin filed a subsequent writ of habeas corpus, a motion in the
alternative for leave to file the application as an original writ of
habeas corpus, and a motion for stay of execution in the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals based on "new developments." 11 5

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
Jul. 31,

Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1383, 1387.
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1387-88.
Id. at 1390-91.
Id. at 1390.
Id. at 1392.
Id. at 1372 (majority opinion).
Ex parte Medellin, No. WR-50191-03, 2008 WL 2952485, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008).
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These "new developments," however, did not persuade the Texas
court to grant any of Medellin's motions. 116
According to Medellin, these new developments included:
(1) the United States Supreme Court's decision in Medellin v. Texas,
affirming and clarifying this Court's opinion in applicant's case; (2)
the fact that a bill has been introduced in the United States House of
Representatives which, if passed into law, would grant applicant a
right to the judicial process required by Avena; (3) the indication by
a Texas Senator that he will introduce similar legislation in the Texas Legislature in the 2009 session; and (4) the fact that the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, allegedly 'the only body to
have reviewed all of the evidence pertaining to [applicant's] Vienna
Convention violation under the standard required by the ICJ,' on July 24, 2008, issued its preliminary findings concluding that applicant
was prejudiced by the violation of his Vienna Convention rights. 1 17

Regarding the applicability of the Supreme Court's decision to
his case before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Medellin
warned that Mexico had instituted a subsequent proceeding in
the ICJ to clarify that court's Avena decision and argued that the
Texas court should wait until the ICJ decided that new proceeding. 1 1 8 The court issued a per curiam order denying Medellin's
motions and dismissing his case.1 1 9 In a concurring statement,
Justice Tom Price, joined by two other justices, said the court's
2006 decision in Ex Parte Medellin foreclosed the need to wait for
any subsequent ICJ decision on this matter. 120 Based on the
same reasoning, the concurring justices stated that the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights' decision cannot interject in the United States' judicial machinery.1 21
Nor did the justices find the pending federal or state legislation
persuasive.1 2 2 While they noted such legislation may have an impact on Medellin's case should it be enacted, speculation does not

116. Id. at*2.
117. Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).
118. Id. at *2; see also Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in
the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Req. for Advisory Op.) (Order
of July 16, 2008) available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14639.pdf [hereinafter

Request for Avena Interpretation].
119.
120.
121.
122.

Ex ParteMedellin, 2008 WL 2952485, at *1-2.
Id. at *3 (Price, J., concurring).
See id.
Id.
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require the court to overturn his sentence.12 3 Indeed, "[u]ntil such
a statute is passed, the Avena decision is not binding; and if Avena is not binding, the applicant cannot predicate a due process
claim upon it."124 The federal legislation in question, the Avena
Case Implementation Act of 2008,125 remains in the House Judiciary Committee at the time of this article's publication.1 2 6
After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellin's motions, Medellin petitioned the Supreme Court of the
United States for writ of certiorari, for a stay of execution, and for
writ of habeas corpus. 12 7 Just like the Texas court, the Supreme
Court found the prospect of the pending federal legislation or the
introduction of Texas legislation impacting Medellin's case "too
remote to justify an order from this Court staying the sentence
imposed by the Texas courts."1 2 8
Four justices-Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerdissented.129 Justice Stevens reiterated his concerns about the
decision's impact upon the United States' international reputation, because "[b]alancing the honor of the Nation against the
modest burden of a short delay to ensure that the breach is unavoidable convince[d] [him] that the application for a stay should
be granted."13 0 Both Justices Ginsburg and Souter argued a stay
of execution should be granted until the Court heard the United

123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
H.R. 6481, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008). Section 2 of the bill reads:
(a) Civil Action.-Any person whose rights are infringed by a violation by any
nonforeign governmental authority of article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations may in a civil action obtain appropriate relief.
(b) Nature of Relief.-Appropriate relief for the purpose of this section
means(1) any declaratory or equitable relief necessary to secure the rights; and
(2) in any case where the plaintiff is convicted of a criminal offense where the
violation occurs during and in relation to the investigation or prosecution of
that offense, any relief required to remedy the harm done by the violation, including the vitiation of the conviction or sentence where appropriate.
(c) Application-This Act applies with respect to violations occurring before,
on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Id.
126. See Library of Congress, THOMAS, H.R. 6481, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bd
query/z?dl10:h.r.06481: (last visited Nov. 00, 2008).
127. See Medellin v. Texas, Nos. 06-984, 08-5573, 08-5574, 2008 WL 3821478, at *1
(U.S. Aug. 5, 2008) (per curiam).

128.
129.
130.

Id. at*1.
Id. at *1-4.
Id. at *1-2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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States' clarification of its statements made before the ICJ in Request for Interpretationof the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.13 1 In that
proceeding, the United States represented to the ICJ that the
United States did not believe it needed to make "further efforts to
implement this Court's Avena Judgment, and.., would 'continue
to work to give that Judgment full effect, including in the case of
Mr. Medellin."'132 Justice Breyer and his fellow dissenting justices agreed, but also explicitly stated that Medellin's execution
placed the United States in violation of international law. 133
After Governor Rick Perry refused pleas from President Bush,
Mexico, and the United Nations' Secretary General to stay Medellin's execution, 13 4 Jos6 Ernesto Medellin was executed by the
State of Texas on August 5, 2008 and pronounced dead at 9:57
p.m. that evening. 13 5 The mounting international pressure ultimately did not sway Texas's position on the matter:
Although we accord the greatest respect to, and admiration for, the
[ICJ] and its judgments, we, like the Supreme Court, cannot trample
on our fundamental laws in deference to its judgment ....
[I]f we cut
down our laws to suit another sovereign that operates under a different system of justice, we could not stand upright in the lawless
winds that would then blow. If we violate our state and federal procedural rules for this particular applicant, we should violate then for
all American defendants as well. And then we would have no rules
and no law at all.

131. Id. at *2 (Souter , J., dissenting); id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Request For Avena Interpretation, supra
note 118, at 1 37).
133. Id. at *3-4 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objections, From Bush
and International Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A19; Mexican Family Grieves After
Execution, AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 6, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iq
UisxP3AGvOxrDajJGxiBskyeug (last visited ___). Governor Perry pointed to the brutality
of the murders as reason to proceed with the execution. McKinley, supra.
135. Allan Turner et al., Medellin Put to Death After One Last Appeal, HOUSTON
CHRON., Aug. 6, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.
mpl?id=2008_4607142. Two days later, Texas executed a Honduran national, Heliburto
Chi, for the murder of his former boss during a robbery. David Stout, Texas Executes Inmate After Court Steps Aside, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.
comI200/08/08/us/O8texas.html?ref=us. Based on the Supreme Court's action in Medellin,
Chi's counsel noted their argument based on the Vienna Convention was foreclosed and
instead relied on a 1927 consular rights treaty between the United States and Honduras.
Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.comlwp/new.treatybased-challenge-to-execution/ (Aug. 7, 2008, 13:24 EST).
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Some societies may judge our death penalty barbaric. Most Texans,
however, consider death a just penalty in certain rare circumstances.
Many Europeans may disagree. So be it.136

VI. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF MEDELLIN

A. Negative Effect on the United States'International
Relationships
Both the majority and dissent warned of the potentially harmful impact the other's approach to Medellin will have on the United States' international relationships.137 Justice Roberts stated
that the dissent "risks the United States' involvement in international agreements,"13 8 while Justice Breyer warned that the majority's approach calls the enforceability of all ICJ judgments into
question.1 39 On a macro level, some warn Medellin signals to the
world that "America's word isn't what it was in the world community."140 Others would argue that not complying with the ICJ
judgment risks the reciprocal safety and rights of American citizens abroad.141 The mixed reaction to Medellin's execution in
Mexico further complicates predictions as to how this case will affect the United States' reputation. 142 However, such fears seem to

136. Ex Parte Medellin, No. WR-50191-03, 2008 WL 2952485, at *6, *8 (Tex. Crim.
App. Jul. 31, 2008) (Cochran, J., concurring).
137. See Posting of Jeremy Telman to ContractsProf Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.
com/contractsproLblog/2008/weekl5/index.html (Apr. 7, 2008).
138. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1362 (2008).
139. Id. at 1387-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140. Editorial, Texas and a Treaty: America's Word Cannot be Taken at Face Value,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 28, 2008, at B6, available at http://www.postgazette.com/pg/08088/868545-35.stm.
141. See Heather M. Heath, Non-Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations and Its Effect on Reciprocity for United States Citizens Abroad, 17 N.Y. INT'L L.
REV. 1, 50 (2004) ("[N]on-compliance with the Vienna Convention carries possibly serious
consequences abroad .... "); Editorial, Split Decision: The High Court Properly Rebuked
Bush, but It Should Have Given a Mexican Man His Day in Court, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26,
2008, at 20 [hereinafter Split Decision] ("[T]he majority's refusal to apply the Vienna Convention in this case will have consequences for U.S. diplomacy and for the way Americans
are treated abroad.").
142. Michael Graczyk, Killer from Mexico Executed in Texas, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 6, 2008,
at A2, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a12008/08/O6/MNGU125L
87.DTL ("[A] small group of [Medellin's] relatives condemned his execution"); Medellin Execution Draws Little Attention in Mexico, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 6, 2008, available
at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontentdws/news/world/mexico/stories/080608dnint
medellinmexico. ldf0681e.html (noting that in a speech the day after Medellin's execution,
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be grounded in more than just compliance with an ICJ judgment-those warning against such ramifications also assert that
the reputation of the United States has already been damaged
through its anti-terrorism policies, and military tribunals in particular.14 3 Further, as the Court pointed out, nothing indicates
that other Vienna Convention parties would reciprocate the United States' blind adherence to ICJ judgments.144 Some international experts note that Medellin demonstrates a flaw in the enforceability of international law; however, a government should
nevertheless follow ICJ judgments to further a nation's policy interests. 14 5 Though certainly not bolstering the United States'
reputation in the international community, Medellin will not be
the sole cause of the demise of the United States' international relationships.
B. Treaty Language
As Medellin demonstrated, treaties tend to reflect the eye of
the interpreter.14 6 Both the majority and the dissent correctly focused upon the text of the U.N. Charter, but reached very different conclusions regarding the self-executing nature of the ICJ
judgment. 147 In light of this, those entering into treaties with the
President Felipe Calderon of Mexico made no mention of Medellin's execution and Mexican newspapers contained only "small mentions [of Medellin's execution] lower down on
the front pages-and in some cases, [his execution] wasn't on the front page at all"); Turner et al., supra note 135 (noting that, while small protests occurred throughout Mexico,
many Mexicans supported Medellin's execution). Much of this mixed reaction, however,
may be attributed to Mexican news agencies' focus being diverted to the kidnapping and
murder of a 14-year-old boy. See Medellin Execution Draws Little Attention in Mexico, supra; see also Mark Stevenson, Crime-weary Mexico Barely Focuses on U.S. Execution, Boston.com, Aug. 6, 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/latinamerica/art
icles/2008/08/O6fcrime-weary-mexico barelyfocuseson_us_execution/.
143. Heath, supra note 141, at 47-50.
144. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1363 (2008).
145. Mariette le Roux, Medellin Execution Highlights Flaw in International Law,
AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 7, 2008, available at http://afp.google.com/article/AleqM5j
B4nmOsNPN3-lAhMrewWSOA8zlA ('International law cannot bind a state against its
will, simply because we don't have a world government, a world legislature, or a world
judicial system,' said Jann Kleffner, international law professor at the University of Amsterdam.").
146. Glashausser, supra note 16, at 26-27. Indeed, "if there is any type of legal document that legitimately can be interpreted in contradictory ways, it is treaties." Id. at 26.
147. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1358 (reasoning "undertakes to comply" means the
U.N. Charter is non-self-executing); id. at 1384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reasoning "undertakes to comply" means the U.N. Charter is self-executing). To complicate matters further,
Justice Stevens found "undertakes to comply" to refer to a general good faith obligation.
See id. at 1373 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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United States may use more strict and explicit language, which
may deter the United States and, for that matter, other countries,
from entering into such treaties.14 8 Some, however, would argue
that no such language is needed, as the text of the Constitution
provides the explicit language that both sides of the Court seem
to require.149 At first blush, the Supremacy Clause makes the
domestic enforcement of treaties appear straightforward; the
practical implications of such text, however, have never been
clear. Those criticizing Medellin even note that this nation's early
jurisprudence required more to determine a treaty's domestic effect.150 While the text of the Constitution places treaties on the
same footing as domestic laws, judicial review determines whether treaties shall have such an effect. To persuade courts to give
such an interpretation, treaty authors likely will move toward
more explicit language.151
C. PresidentialPower
The Supreme Court took relatively little time in concluding
that the President's Memorandum was not an authorized act of
executive power. 1 5 2 Significant time, however, was not necessary,
as such a matter speaks directly to the heart of both separation
and division of powers so inherent in American government.i 5 3

148. See id. at 1381-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting specific self-executing language
"erects legalistic hurdles that can threaten the application of provisions in many existing
commercial and other treaties and make it more difficult to negotiate new ones").
149. See Posting of David Sloss to Opinio Juris, http://opiniojuris.org/2008/03/25/med
ellin-and-the-perversion-of-legal-realism/ (Mar. 25, 2008, 18:20 EST) ("The question whether the U.N. Charter is federal law is a question about U.S. constitutional law. Accordingly, the answer is to be found in the text of the Constitution .... By deciding that the U.N.
Charter is not federal law, the Court has effectively rewritten the text of the Supremacy
Clause to say that treaties are the Law of the Land unless we, the Supreme Court, decide
otherwise.").
150. See id. ("[E]xecutory treaty provisions require some further action by the U.S.
government ... [though] legislative action is [not] always necessary to execute an executory treaty provision.").
151. See Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.comlwpl
commentary- medellinl (Aug. 6, 2008, 07:53 EST) (noting the role of the treaty's silence in
Medellin's case and concluding Congress had not acquiesced to make the ICJ judgment
binding domestic law).
152. See Posting of Julian Ku to Opinio Juris, http://.opiniojuris.org/2008/03/25/medel
lin-my-early-thoughts/ (Mar. 25, 2008, 13:04 EST).
153. See Split Decision, supra note 141 ("In our system, state courts (as well as federal
courts) are not supposed to take their orders from the president."); Posting of Ilya Shapiro
to Cato@Liberty, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2008/03/26/supreme-court-to-president-bu
sh-don't-mess-with-texas/ (Mar. 26, 2008, 08:35 EST) ('CTelling state courts how to do their

20091

THE TREATIES THAT BIND

The framers worried that unfettered executive power over treaties would lead to a repeat of the tyrannical British government
they so despised.154 Because of the nature of the United States
government, a President simply cannot have such unilateral authority. 155
The Court, however, left open the broader issue as to what the
President may do to ensure that treaties properly effectuated by
the legislature are domestically enforced.15 6 Some scholars note
precedents indicate a President could have such a power. 15 7 With
the recent claims of executive power, this issue will undoubtedly
arise again. 158
But perhaps federal and state executives have all the power
they need for those cases involving the execution of foreign citizens of countries with which the United States has a treaty. For
those foreign nationals committing federal crimes and facing the
death penalty, the President could utilize his constitutional power
to pardon that foreign national should he or she believe the international interests of the United States outweigh such a severe
conviction.1 5 9 Likewise, Governor Perry had the opportunity to
use his clemency power to stay Medellin's execution, but did not
do so. 160 In this regard, the President's "Take Care" power includes his "pardon power." Of course, as Medellin demonstrates,

jobs is simply not among the powers of the nation's chief executive.").
154. Yoo, supra note 15, at 2042 ("An effort to subsume the legislative power into the
treaty power would have recalled, particularly in Anti-Federalist minds, the corruption of
Parliament by the Crown.").
155. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371 (2008).
156. Id. at 1367 n.13 ('The dissent.., finds it 'difficult to believe that in the exercise of
his Article II powers pursuant to a ratified treaty, the President can never take action that
would result in setting aside state law.' We agree. The questions here are the far more limited ones .... ) (quoting id. at 1390 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
157. See, e.g., Posting of Julian Ku to Opinio Juris, supra note 152 (discussing Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) ("[W]here, as here, the settlement of claims
has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy
dispute between our country and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the President's action, we are not prepared to say that the President
lacks the power to settle such claims.")).
158. See Van Alstine, supra note 14, at 339 ('This reasoning is at the foundation of a
whole range of powers claimed by the present administration ....
[which] has defended
unilateral presidential action in a variety of contexts as an exercise of the national executive's implied or inherent powers in foreign affairs.").
159. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2 ("The President... shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.").
160. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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the President cannot use his "Take Care" power to compel the
states to follow ICJ decisions or treaties.16 i
D. States as Treaty Players:Should Erie Go International?
Because treaties increasingly regulate individual conduct,
"[states ... are becoming substantially important foreign policy
players."1 62 Professor Philip C. Jessup, echoing the sentiments of
our framers and invoking the specter of the Erie Doctrine, noted
that treaties should not be left to the states' discretionary implementation. 163 To some, the Court's opinion in Medellin demonstrates a "muddled analytical approach."164 Perhaps, then, an
analytical regime similar to Erie is warranted for the implementation of international treaties and their related ICJ judgments. 165
The details for such a proposal go beyond the scope of the subject matter for this casenote, but a basic principle for such a
scheme speaks to the heart of the controversy in Medellin. One
important aspect of the Erie pantheon, the outcome determinative test and its federal interest balancing corollary,i 6 6 could be

161. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1349, 1372 ("This authority allows the President
to execute the laws, not make them ....
[T]he Avena judgment is not domestic law; accor-

dingly, the President cannot rely on his Take Care powers here."). But see Jordon J. Paust,
Medellin, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive Authority, 31
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 301, 311 & n.37, 312-15 (2008) (arguing the Supreme Court
did not sufficiently defer to the president's "Take Care" power in construing the President's Memorandum in Medellin as an "executive directive").

162.

Posting of Julian Ku to Opinio Juris, supra note 152.

163. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111 n.3 (1986) (noting Jessup
"recognized the potential dangers were Erie extended to legal problems affecting interna-

tional relations. He cautioned that rules of international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations." (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964))).
164. See Posting of David Sloss to Opinio Juris, supra note 149 (arguing that the Court
did not distinguish between the questions of whether provisions of the U.N. Charter are
federal law and how to enforce the United States's obligations under the U.N. Charter).
165. For another policy proposal involving narrowly construed Congressional legislation, see Posting of Jason Harrow to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/medel

lin-discussion-board-the-ball-is-in-congresss-court/ (Mar. 27, 2008, 16:00 EST).
166. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958) ("[T]he
inquiry here is whether the federal policy ... should yield to the state rule in the interest
of furthering the objective that the litigation should not come out one way in the federal
court and another way in the state court."); Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109
(1945) ("[T]he intent of [Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome
of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules
determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.").
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modified and used in adjudicating a state's implementation of
treaties. Such a rule could provide that where a state's procedural
rules conflict with the provisions of a treaty, those state rules
should be followed if ignoring them would substantially affect the
outcome of that litigation. If, however, federal interests outweigh
such a state procedural rule, the federal law (i.e., the treaty)
should be followed.
E. Does Erie Even Need To Go International?
But is such a procedural rubric even necessary? Osagiede v.
United States, a case decided after Medellin, allowed Osagiede, a
Nigerian national, to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim when his counsel failed to seek a remedy for the government's failure to notify Osagiede of his right to consular assistance under the Vienna Convention.1 67 Making a point to note
that "foreign nationals within the territory of the United States
are protected by the Sixth Amendment,"1 6 8 the court stated that
Osagiede sought relief under the Constitution, not the Convention, even though his Sixth Amendment claim involved his Vienna Convention right to consular assistance. 16 9 Therefore, his ineffective assistance claim was properly before the court. 170
The Seventh Circuit then proceeded with the ordinary ineffective assistance analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington.1 7 1
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Osagiede had to show
that "(1) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when measured against 'prevailing professional norms,' and (2) but for the deficient performance, there
is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different."172 Regarding the first prong of the
Strickland analysis, the court found Osagiede's counsel's performance was deficient, as "the Article 36 violation should have rung
a bell with a reasonable attorney."1 73 In order to satisfy the
second prong of the Strickland analysis, Osagiede had to show
what assistance he might have received from his consulate had he

167. No. 07-1131, 2008 WL 4140630, at "1, *5-6 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 2008).
168. Id. at *5 (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)).
169. Id. (citing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 363-64 & n.3 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
170. Id. at *6.
171. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
172. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-96).
173. Id. at *8-9.
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been informed of his Vienna Convention right.174 Osagiede proffered that his consulate may have assisted in interpreting tape
recordings at issue in his case. 175 Thus, the court held that the
record did not 'conclusively show[ ]' that Osagiede is not entitled
to relief on his Sixth Amendment claim" and granted his habeas
petition.176 As this analysis is much more straightforward than
determining the domestic reach of an international treaty, it may
be the future of foreign nationals' claims of violations of their
right to consular assistance. 1 77 At least for ineffective consular
assistance claims, specifically consulting the treaty was not necessary. Whether state law can offer relief for all questions that
intersect with treaty provisions remains to be seen.
VII. CONCLUSION

Medellin held that neither Avena alone nor the President may
compel a state to act in compliance with the Vienna Convention.178 To some, such a holding seems counterintuitive.17 9 To
others, the holding presented a victory for federalism.180 One
thing, however, is clear: the perfect storm regarding the domestic
enforcement and effect of treaties is far from over. 18 1

Mary D. Hallerman

174. Id. at *10.
175. Id.
176. Id. at*11.
177. See Posting of Roger Alford to Opinio Juris, http://opiniojuris.org/2008/09/24/thevccr-and-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel-2/ (Sept. 24, 2008, 11:53 EST) ("It looks like this
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